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Media policy is designed in large part to support high-fidelity infor-
mation—news with a signal-to-noise ratio necessary for self-government. Fed-
eral broadcast regulations, the Supreme Court precedents upholding them, in-
vestments in public media, and journalistic norms all seek to support an 
informed citizenry and glorify the predicate values of truth and robust debate. 
“Signal,” in this context, is information that is truthful and supportive of demo-
cratic discourse. “Noise” misinforms and undermines discursive potential. 
When signal overpowers noise, there is high fidelity in the information envi-
ronment. 
Policymakers and the public are outraged at digital information platforms 
(“platforms” or “digital platforms”) variously for the platforms’ roles in pro-
moting noise via disinformation and hate speech.1 This rage is fomenting calls 
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to break up the platform companies. Reducing platform size may address some 
aspects of overweening power, but antitrust law will not correct problematic 
information dynamics. For one thing, splintered companies are likely to re-
consolidate. For another, if more small companies simply replicate the same 
practices, similar patterns are likely to emerge with different owners.2 Diverse 
ownership is a justly enduring value in media policy, but not a panacea. 
A distinct and often complementary approach to antitrust is regulation. 
Digital platforms have operated largely free from the media regulations. So too, 
they have been untethered by the norms around media responsibility, and asso-
ciated legal liability, that have constrained publishers. Transparency rules and 
norms have never applied to digital platforms, but have long been useful for fi-
delity. In analog commercial and political advertising, rules require sponsorship 
identification on the theory that if people know who is speaking, they will bet-
ter be able to filter out noise. Because disclosure mandates increase infor-
mation, rather than suppress it, transparency policies fare well from the free 
speech perspective. It is thus natural that transparency would top policy agen-
das as the cure-all or at least a “cure-enough” for online harms. As govern-
ments now begin to close the digital loophole and extend analog-era regulations 
to digital flows of information, we should understand the limits of these moves.  
Transparency alone is no match for platform design choices that degrade 
fidelity. Algorithmic amplification creates a digital undertow that weakens 
cognitive autonomy and makes it difficult for people to sift signal from noise. 
Merely importing analog-era regulations into the digital realm will not ade-
quately reckon with how meaning is made online. If the internet is a stack of 
functions, with data transmission at the bottom, and content at the top, tradi-
tional transparency happens at the surface where content emerges. But it is 
lower down the stack where cascades of individual actions, paid promotions, 
and platform priorities determine how messages move. Meaning is made where 
likes and shares and algorithmic optimizing minutely construct audiences, 
where waves of disinformation swell and noxious speech gathers energy. In-
creasing fidelity by empowering individual autonomous choice will require 
both transparency and other interventions at the level of system architecture. To 
this end, disclosures should cover the reach and targeting of recommended and 
sponsored messages. 
One way to understand disclosure rules is that they create friction in digital 
flows—friction that opens pathways for reflection. Disclosures that contextual-
 
1  See, e.g., Andrew Marantz, Opinion, Free Speech Is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-social-media-violence.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/5H8E-R9NF] (summarizing public rage as “noxious speech” and com-
paring it to pollution). 
2  Cf. Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech 
Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 69, 79 (2019) (arguing that competition may not 
“provide consumers with greater privacy or would better combat information disorder; un-
regulated competition might instead trigger a race to the bottom, and many smaller firms 
might be harder to regulate than a few large ones.”). 
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ize the objectives or origins or reliability of information interrupt the chain of 
transmission. In this sense, they are a form of “meaningful inefficiency” that 
fosters civic engagement.3 Disclosure is not the only frictive intervention. Other 
sources of friction would be queries to users about whether they really want to 
circulate hate or lies in order to check impulsive high frequency mis-
information trading. Such forms of salubrious friction could disincentivize and 
disrupt practices that addict, surveil, and dull critical functions. New sources of 
friction can slow the pull of low-fidelity information and equip people to resist 
it. 
Part I will briefly describe the historic relationship between American me-
dia policy and information fidelity, focusing on transparency rules and the reli-
ance on listener cognitive autonomy. Part II will show how analog-era trans-
parency rules are being adapted for digital platforms with a view toward 
restoring and protecting autonomy. Part III will discuss the ways in which these 
transparency solutions alone cannot cope with algorithmic noise and suggests 
that more systemic transparency is necessary. Part IV will propose that new 
sources of friction in information flows may be needed to foster information 
fidelity amidst the algorithmic production of salience. 
I. HIGH-FIDELITY INFORMATION AND MEDIA POLICY 
The development of American twentieth-century media, was, as Paul Starr 
argues, inextricably tied to liberal constitutionalism and its values of truth, rea-
soned discourse, and mental freedom.4 This linkage was reflected in media pol-
icies that yoked regulation to safeguarding autonomy5 and encouraging demo-
cratic participation.6 A principal media policy goal has been to boost 
information fidelity, or the signal-to-noise ratio, in the service of democratic 
processes.7 The signal is information necessary to self-government character-
ized by accuracy, relevance, diversity of views, and similar values. As Justice 
Stephen Breyer put it, “[C]ommunications policy . . . seeks to facilitate the pub-
lic discussion and informed deliberation, which . . . democratic government 
presupposes.”8 
 
3  This phrase comes from ERIC GORDON & GABRIEL MUGAR, MEANINGFUL INEFFICIENCIES: 
CIVIC DESIGN IN AN AGE OF DIGITAL EXPEDIENCY 7–8 (2020) (identifying and analyzing the 
introduction of “meaningful inefficiencies” into public processes to foster engagement and 
understanding). 
4  PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 390, 391 (2004). 
5  See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 (1989). 
6  See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000). 
7  See, e.g., In Re Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 
143, 151 (1969) (“Rigging or slanting the news is a most heinous act against the public in-
terest—indeed, there is no act more harmful to the public's ability to handle its affairs.”). 
8  Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226–27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part). 
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Digital platforms can overwhelm signal with noise. Scale and speed, user 
propagation, automated promotion, inauthentic and hidden amplification, and 
the mixture of sponsored and organic speech all make digital discourse differ-
ent. Alongside these technical differences are sociopolitical ones. Digital plat-
forms emerged from the world of software engineering, not the press. They are 
not inextricably tied to liberal constitutionalism. They stumbled into media 
without the norms or bonds of twentieth-century professionalized press tradi-
tions or regulatory pressures. It is therefore not shocking that platform architec-
ture not only tolerates but even favors low-fidelity speech.9 Accuracy has little 
structural advantage in the attention economy.10 Deepfakes that alter image or 
sound, bot-generated narratives masquerading as groundswell truths, and other 
social media contrivances amplify disinformation and can create epistemic 
bubbles. Algorithmic systems deliver content to audiences deemed receptive 
based on data-inferred characteristics.11 This delivery system has design fea-
tures like the infinite scroll or social rewards of provocation that bypass listen-
ers’ cognitive checks and autonomous choice.12 The result is a noisy infor-
mation environment that is inhospitable to the production of shared truths and 
the trust necessary for self-government.13  
American media policy can do very little to eradicate noise. For the most 
part, the First Amendment is hostile to bureaucratic judgments about infor-
 
9  This seems to be truer on the right of the political spectrum than on the left. See YOCHAI 
BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND 
RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 383–84 (2018). Information gluts and poor-quality 
information were anticipated, if downplayed, byproducts of low-cost speech distribution. 
Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1838 (1995) (“But 
when speakers can communicate to the public directly, it’s possible their speech will be less 
trustworthy: They might not be willing to hire fact checkers, or might not be influenced 
enough by professional journalistic norms, or might not care enough about their long-term 
reputation for accuracy.”). 
10  See Claire Wardle, Fake News. It's Complicated, FIRST DRAFT (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/fake-news-complicated [https://perma.cc/LT3Q-9XLB]. 
11  See Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Think You’re Discreet Online? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/opinion/computational-inference.htm 
l (“Because of technological advances and sheer amount of data now available about billions 
of other people, discretion no longer suffices to protect your privacy. Computer algorithms 
and network analyses can now infer, with a sufficiently high degree of accuracy, a wide 
range of things about you that you may have never disclosed, including your moods, your 
political beliefs, your sexual orientation and your health.”).  
12  See Chauncey Neyman, A Survey of Addictive Software Design 2–3 (June 2017) (un-
published senior project), https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11 
27&context=cscsp [https://perma.cc/XN7W-SWTF]; Vian Bakir & Andrew McStay, Fake 
News and the Economy of Emotions: Problems, Causes, Solutions, 6 DIGIT. JOURNALISM 
154, 167 (2018). 
13  See, e.g., PETER POMERANTSEV, THIS IS NOT PROPAGANDA: ADVENTURES IN THE WAR 
AGAINST REALITY xv, 1 (2019); JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS 5 (2015); Tim 
Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT. INST. AT COLUMBIA 
UNIV. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete 
[https://perma.cc/42F3-EQWD]. 
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mation quality. Aside from defamation actions and outside of advertising, the 
law generally protects falsehoods from government censure.14 So strong is the 
aversion to policing truth that investigative journalists who break the law in or-
der to reveal truths enjoy less protection than those who misinform in order to 
deceive.15 The constitutional tolerance for lies rests on the assumption that peo-
ple can and will privilege truth if given the chance. This is the classic “market-
place of ideas” formulation of a free speech contest for mindshare.16 Truth is 
expected to outperform lies so long as people are equipped to choose it.  
A high-fidelity information environment in liberal democracies thus de-
pends heavily on the exercise of cognitive autonomy: people reasoning for 
themselves.17 Respect for autonomy is at the root of the First Amendment’s 
guarantees of free speech, religion, assembly, and petition. So in a decision in-
terpreting the First Amendment, Justice Louis Brandeis observed, “Those who 
won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of po-
litical truth.”18 From the heart of the First Amendment, the impulse to safe-
guard autonomous thought runs straight through the Fourth Amendment’s pro-
tection against unreasonable government searches. By impeding entry to the 
house, the Constitution made it harder for government to enter the mind. Justice 
Brandeis again: the Founders “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”19  
Law developed over the twentieth century to safeguard the free mind from 
deceptive messaging conveyed by mass communication, especially via the 
mechanism of the disclosure requirements discussed below. There were other 
broadcast law interventions—significant more for their rhetorical weight than 
their operative force—that sought to prevent manipulation. Federal Communi-
cations Commission (“FCC”) rules prohibit broadcast hoaxes and the intention-
al slanting of news: “[A]s public trustees, broadcast licensees may not inten-
tionally distort the news. . . . ‘[R]igging or slanting the news is a most heinous 
act against the public interest.’ ”20 Long ago, the FCC banned the broadcast of 
 
14  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012). 
15  See Michael C. Dorf & Sidney G. Tarrow, Stings and Scams: “Fake News,” the First 
Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 9, 19, 23, 28 (2017). 
16  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”). Enlightenment antecedents abound. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 86 
(David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 2 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1918). 
 17  See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommoda-
tion, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 205, 220 (2000). 
18  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For autonomy 
theories of the First Amendment, see generally Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 215–16, 218–20 (1972). 
19  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
20  FCC, MEDIA BUREAU, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE 
FROM YOUR LOCAL STATION 12 (2019), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/public-and-
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“functional music”—something like muzak—for fear that it would subliminally 
seduce the public into a buying mood.21 What these regulatory examples show 
is a concern for listener autonomy: that listeners not be deceived or lured into 
false consciousness. So freed, the listener can presumably ensure for herself a 
high-fidelity information diet.  
The operation of autonomous choice to filter signal from noise, as it devel-
oped in the analog world, has to be understood against the backdrop of signal-
supporting government policies and industry practices. Broadcasters have been 
subject to public service requirements of various kinds, affirmative program-
ming requirements for news, and the erstwhile “fairness requirements” to venti-
late opposing viewpoints on controversial issues.22 The Public Broadcasting 
Act23 established subsidies for noncommercial media that would 
be responsive to the interests of people[,] . . . constitute an expression of diversi-
ty and excellence, . . . develop[] . . . programming that involves creative risks 
and that addresses the needs of unserved and underserved audiences . . . [and] 
constitute valuable local community resources for utilizing electronic media to 
address national concerns and solve local problems.24  
Broadcasters who are inclined to amplify deceptive messages might also be de-
terred by the spectrum licensing system, which at least formally subjects broad-
casters to the risk that they will lose their licenses through petitions to deny re-
newals.25 
More signal-boosting work was done by press norms and business struc-
tures. Defamation law incentivizes publishers to take care with the truth. 
Newspaper mastheads lay responsibility for content at the feet of named pub-
lishers and editors. The professionalization of the news business led to norms 
 
broadcasting.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B62-JR7R] (citing In Re Complaints Covering CBS 
Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969)); see also Report on Editorial-
izing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254–55 (1949). There was a recent congres-
sional request to enforce this rule against Sinclair Broadcasting for alleged misrepresenta-
tions in news broadcasts. See Press Release, Sen. Tom Udall, Udall, Cantwell Lead 
Colleagues in Call for FCC to Investigate Sinclair Broadcasting for News Distortion (Apr. 
12, 2018), https://www.tomudall.senate.gov/news/press-releases/udall-cantwell-lead-colleag 
ues-in-call-for-fcc-to-investigate-sinclair-broadcasting-for-news-distortion [https://perma.cc/ 
8PN5-Y2SW]. 
21  Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 544–45 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (considering a 
challenge to the FCC regulation of muzak). Years later, the FCC also declared, without so 
ordering, subliminal advertising unsuitable for broadcast. Public Notice, Broadcast of Infor-
mation by Means of “Subliminal Perception” Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016, 1017 (1974) 
(declaring that attempts “to convey information to the viewer by transmitting messages be-
low the threshold level of normal awareness,” are “contrary to the public interest” because 
such advertisements are “intended to be deceptive.”). 
22  See STUART M. BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 
xxiv (4th ed. 2015). 
23  47 U.S.C. § 396. 
24  Id. § 396(a)(5)–(8). 
25  Note, Use of Petitions by Minority Groups to Deny Broadcast License Renewals, 1978 
DUKE L.J. 271, 271–84. 
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of fact-checking and fidelity.26 Analog-era media economics tended to reward 
high-fidelity news production.27 Local newspapers enjoyed near-monopoly 
claims on advertising revenue that supported investigative journalists.28 Be-
cause news was bundled with entertainment and sports, media outlets cross-
subsidized one with revenue from the other.29 These economics have of course 
been upended in the digital world, where content bundles are disaggregated and 
digital platforms absorb the advertising revenue needed for journalism—
without in fact producing it. 
One other thing to note about the analog media environment that birthed 
media policy is that analog information flows were much slower. The task of 
filtering signal from noise was made easier simply by virtue of analog system 
constraints. Attention abundance and content scarcity meant that more cogni-
tive resources could be allocated to evaluating a particular piece of content.30 
The information flow through newspapers and broadcast channels left time 
enough to absorb disclosures or discriminate among messages. Perhaps most 
significantly, the flow was not narrowcast. Noise in the form of lies or manipu-
lation would be exposed to a large audience, which was itself a form of disci-
pline and an opportunity for collective filtering. 
 
26  See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, Journalism: Expertise, Authority, and Power in Demo-
cratic Life, in THE MEDIA AND SOCIAL THEORY 248, 248–49 (David Hesmondhalgh & Jason 
Toynbee eds., 2008). 
27  See generally VICTOR PICKARD, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT JOURNALISM? CONFRONTING THE 
MISINFORMATION SOCIETY 8–10 (2020). 
28  JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY'S DETECTIVES: THE ECONOMICS OF INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISM 4, 8 (2016); EMILY BELL ET AL., THE PLATFORM PRESS: HOW SILICON VALLEY 
REENGINEERED JOURNALISM 9 (2017), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:15 
dv41ns27 [https://perma.cc/DA6W-M6PL]. 
29  HAMILTON, supra note 28, at 17 (“Rather than have three different trucks deliver sports, 
entertainment, and government news products, a newspaper gathered all these topics into one 
bundle and delivered that to your home. This meant that content associated with many will-
ing advertisers—real estate, automotive, food—was clustered with story topics few advertis-
ers would seek out, such as poverty or disasters abroad.”); Derek Thompson, If You Don’t 
Watch Sports, TV Is a Huge Rip-Off (So, How Do We Fix It?), THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/if-you-dont-watch-sports-tv-is-a-
huge-rip-off-so-how-do-we-fix-it/265814/ [https://perma.cc/M5FR-ANE4] (“You could say 
that TNT ‘Law and Order’ fans are subsidizing TNT basketball fans. But it’s also the case 
that TNT basketball fans are keeping the lights on for TNT original dramas.”). 
30  Cf. Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scar-
city, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1420–21 (2004) 
(describing audience and attention fragmentation in the early stages of digitalization); Wu, 
supra note 13 (“The most important change in the expressive environment can be boiled 
down to one idea: it is no longer speech itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners. 
Emerging threats to public discourse take advantage of this change. . . . [E]merging tech-
niques of speech control depend on (1) a range of new punishments, like unleashing ‘troll 
armies’ to abuse the press and other critics, and (2) ‘flooding’ tactics (sometimes called ‘re-
verse censorship’) that distort or drown out disfavored speech through the creation and dis-
semination of fake news, the payment of fake commentators, and the deployment of propa-
ganda robots.”). 
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With this background, we can turn to the transparency rules that developed 
in the analog environment to safeguard cognitive autonomy and enhance in-
formation fidelity. It is the translation of these rules for digital platforms that is 
the first order work of platform regulation. 
II. FIDELITY OF MESSAGE—KNOW WHO’S TALKING TO YOU 
In reaction to the social media disruptions of 2016—including foreign in-
terference in the messaging around the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and 
the presidential election in the United States—western democracies are consid-
ering or adopting laws to try to limit foreign political advertising and surrepti-
tious messaging of all kinds.31 These interventions are forward-looking as well, 
with an eye toward the expected onslaught of disinformation in future cam-
paigns. At the same time, the largest social media platforms, including Face-
book, Twitter, and YouTube, have taken voluntary steps to police inauthentic 
accounts that violate their terms of service and to be more transparent about the 
sources of political advertising.32 
For the most part, the notion of transparency reflected in both mandated 
and self-imposed measures is an old one: Individuals can be manipulated into 
mistaking noise for signal if they don’t know who is speaking to them. Analog-
era transparency requirements took hold at the level of the message. That is, 
disclosures about a particular advertisement or program were displayed simul-
taneously with the message in order to allow listeners to exercise autonomous 
judgment about that message. The following shows how analog-era media 
transparency rules tried to increase information fidelity and how these rules are 
being adapted for digital flows. 
A. Analog-Era Transparency Rules 
Twentieth-century advertising and media law sought to advance infor-
mation fidelity by increasing transparency of authorship, essentially to help lis-
teners filter out noise. Without knowing who is behind a message, people might 
be manipulated into believing what, in the light of disclosure, is unbelievable. 
Concealed authorship slips messages past cognitive checks that safeguard free-
dom of mind.33 Disclosure mandates aim to restore these checks and enable lis-
teners to apply cognitive resistance. 
 
31  See e.g., LUIS ACOSTA ET AL., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS, LL File No. 2019-017776, at 1–2 (2019) (surveying laws in 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Israel, Japan, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sweden, and Turkey). 
32  See Dawn C. Nunziato, Misinformation Mayhem: Social Media Platforms' Efforts to 
Combat Medical and Political Misinformation, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 32, 33–34, 61, 98 
(2020). 
33  See Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 
497, 522–24 (2015) (describing manipulative marketing techniques that take advantage of 
consumers' cognitive limitations); id. at 518–19, 524, 526–27, 529–30 (discussing manipula-
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Most of the analog-era source disclosures are tied to the message itself. For 
example, print, radio, and television political advertising messages are subject 
to disclosure requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act.34 A “clear 
and conspicuous”35 disclaimer is required to accompany certain “public com-
munications” that expressly advocate for a candidate.36 The disclaimer identi-
fies who paid for the message and whether it was authorized by the candidate. 
The Supreme Court, in Citizens United v. FEC, found these requirements to be 
justified by the government interest in ensuring that “ ‘voters are fully in-
formed’ about . . . who is speaking.”37 In an earlier decision, Justice Antonin 
Scalia celebrated the virtue of transparent political speech, writing, “Requiring 
people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without 
which democracy is doomed.”38 
Disclosure law is also entrusted to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (“FCC”), whose predecessor agency started requiring sponsorship identifi-
cation under the 1927 Radio Communications Act.39 The most notable expan-
sion of these rules followed not a political event but the payola scandals in the 
1950s when record labels bribed DJs to play their music, thus surreptitiously 
appropriating the editorial role.40 It was then that Congress authorized the FCC 
to require broadcasters to disclose paid promotions.41 Disclosure is required 
when “any type of valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid or prom-
ised, charged or accepted” for the inclusion of a sponsored message in a broad-
cast.42 For controversial or political matters, disclosure is required even when 
 
tive effect of covert advertising that evades critical evaluation); Lili Levi, A “Faustian 
Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 696 (2015) 
(explaining that product placement relies on what cognitive psychology calls System 1 cog-
nitive processes—those rapid and unconscious biases and heuristics that tell us to trust). 
34  52 U.S.C. § 30120(a)–(d). 
35  11 C.F.R. § 110.11(c)(1) (2020). 
36  2 U.S.C. § 441d(a); 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a) (2020). Political committees must also include 
a disclaimer in communications sent via email to more than five hundred recipients. See 
Katherine Reynolds, Client Alert: FTC Releases Guidance on Internet Activity for Political 
Committees Ahead of the 2020 Election, JDSUPRA (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.co 
m/legalnews/client-alert-fec-releases-guidance-on-70027/ [https://perma.cc/GXA3-NTFS]. 
37  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
76 (1976)); see also id. at 368 (“Identification of the source of advertising may be required 
as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which 
they are being subjected.” (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 
n.32 (1978))). 
38  Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
39  For a brief history of sponsorship disclosure laws, see Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Market-
ing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 98 (2006) [hereinafter Stealth Marketing]. 
40  See id. at 99. 
41  47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1). 
42  Letter from David H. Solomon, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, to Thomas W. Dean, 
Litig. Dir., NORML Found., 16 FCC. Rcd. 1421, 1423 (Dec. 22, 2000). 
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no consideration is paid.43 Behind this requirement is the idea that faked prove-
nance prevents people from engaging with speech on the level and thereby 
from exercising cognitive autonomy.44 As discussed below, these rules only 
apply to the broadcast media, not to the internet.45 
Another set of source disclosure rules comes from the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”). Once Madison Avenue had perfected techniques to by-
pass critical resistance to commercial messages, it became the job of the FTC to 
protect consumers from being duped. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act empowers the agency to police sponsored messages for unfairness 
or deception.46 To reduce the likelihood that advertising would deceive by con-
cealing motive or authorship, the FTC issued guidance about source disclosures 
for paid product endorsements.47 These disclosures must be “clear and conspic-
uous” “to avoid misleading consumers.”48 Here, in theory, there is no digital 
loophole. Clear and conspicuous guidelines also apply to digital advertisements 
and to digital influencer sponsorship.49 
Some analog-era disclosure rules, while still operating at the message level, 
are meant for information intermediaries, rather than the listener. For example, 
the FCC requires various kinds of “public file” submissions so that the public 
can be made aware of how broadcasters approach their public interest obliga-
tions.50 Broadcasters also have to make disclosures about their ownership struc-
ture so as to inform the public who really holds their communicative power.51 
So too, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) requires this kind of inter-
mediary-focused disclosure about campaign contributions and spending.52 
 
43  47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(2); see also H.R. REP. NO. 86-1800, at 3532 (1960) (stating that a 
sponsorship identification announcement may be required for political programs or discus-
sions of controversial issues even if “the matter broadcast is not ‘paid’ matter”). 
44  Stealth Marketing, supra note 39, at 116 (“Whether the speech urges consumption, as in 
advertising, or urges belief, as in propaganda, it aims to effect audience action through cog-
nitive manipulation, rather than through persuasion.”). 
45  Infra Section II.B. 
46  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2). 
47  16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2020). 
48  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Operation ‘Full Disclosure’ Targets More than 60 
National Advertisers (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/ 
09/operation-full-disclosure-targets-more-60-national-advertisers [https://perma.cc/2XCX-L 
WB4]. 
49  FED. TRADE COMM’N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN 
DIGITAL ADVERTISING 2–3 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-
releases/ftc-staff-revises-online-advertising-disclosure-
guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XPQ-L2AB]. 
50  47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1943, 73.3526(a), 76.1700(a)–(c) (2020). 
51  47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (2020). 
52  11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a) (2020). 
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Though aimed at intermediaries, the objective of these disclosures is still to 
help listeners understand who is speaking to them.53 
B. Adaptation to Digital 
The first rounds of proposals to regulate digital platforms more or less 
adapt analog-era transparency requirements to the internet.54 They attack ma-
nipulation in the form of source concealment at the level of the message.  
Most internet messaging is not covered under the election law term public 
communication,55 and therefore there has been no FEC-required sponsorship 
disclosure on digital platforms. Closing this sort of digital loophole is a 
straightforward, though still unrealized, policy project.56 One of the first at-
tempts to translate analog transparency regimes to the digital world in the Unit-
ed States was the Honest Ads Act, introduced for a second time in March 
2019.57 Seeking to uphold the principle that “the electorate bears the right to be 
fully informed,” the Act would close the digital loophole for online campaign 
ads.58 Platforms would have to reveal the identities of political ad purchasers.59 
While the Honest Ads Act is stalled in Congress as of this writing, several 
states have moved forward to adopt similar legislation, including California, 
Maryland, and New York.60 
California’s Social Media DISCLOSE Act of 2018 extends political adver-
tising sponsorship disclosure requirements to social media. 61 New York's De-
 
53  See generally WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
REGULATION (1992) (discussing the different kinds of disclosure regimes). 
54  For a handful of proposals, see Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulat-
ing “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1255–56, 1260, 
1262–63, 1267–68 (2018). 
55  11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2020) (defining “public communication”). 
56  Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication,” 83 Fed. 
Reg. 12,864, 12,868–69 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110) 
(proposing to modify 11 CFR Parts 100 and 110, either by extending existing political adver-
tising disclaimer regulations to “internet communications” or by adopting a general rule that 
all online advertising contain a “clear and conspicuous” disclaimer of source). 
57  For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 4201–4202 (2019) (incorporating the 
Honest Ads Act). 
58  Id. § 4202. 
59  Mark Warner, Summary of Proposed Honest Ads Act, WARNER.SENATE.GOV, 
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/the-honest-ads-act?page=1 [https://perma.c 
c/3ZTW-BQP4]; see also Mark Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social 
Media and Technology Firms 12 (2018) [hereinafter Warner Policy Proposals] (unpublished 
white paper draft), https://regmedia.co.uk/2018/07/30/warner_social_media_proposal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2R75-WK5Y]. For a more far-reaching proposal, see Wood & Ravel, supra 
note 54, at 1264 (proposing disclosures also for unpaid ads and other communications). 
60  Digital Political Ads, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www 
.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/digital-political-ads.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WA 
B-YXD7]. 
61  Social Media DISCLOSE Act, A.B. 2188, State Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. § 2 (Cal. 
2018). 
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mocracy Protection Act of 2018 requires paid internet and digital political ads 
to display disclaimers stating whether the ad was authorized by a candidate as 
well as who actually paid for the ad.62 Washington State has altered its cam-
paign finance laws to require disclosure of the names and addresses of political 
ad sponsors and the cost of advertising.63 Canada enacted a law requiring that 
platforms publish the verified real names of advertising purchasers.64 
New technologies have created new threats to information fidelity. Bots 
enable massive messaging campaigns that disguise authorship and thereby in-
crease the perceived value or strength of an opinion.65 A substantial number of 
tweeted links originate from fake accounts designed to flood the information 
space with an opinion expressed so frequently that people believe it.66 Deep-
fakes create fraudulent impressions of authorship through ventriloquy, using 
artificial intelligence to fake audio or video.67 Proposed and adopted laws to 
address deepfakes and bot-generated speech are in the same tradition as the po-
litical and advertising disclosure requirements advanced to close the digital 
loopholes. They seek to ensure that people are informed about who is speaking 
to them (in the case of bots) and whether the speech is real (in the case of deep-
fakes). 
California SB 100168 makes it illegal for a bot to communicate with some-
one with “the intention of misleading and without clearly and conspicuously 
disclosing that the bot is not a natural person” and requires removal of offend-
 
62  Democracy Protection Act, A.B. 9930, State Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. §§ 1, 2, 4, 7 
(N.Y. 2018) (amending definition of “political communication” in N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-106 
(McKinney 2019) and adding § 14-107(b) to require digital records of online platform inde-
pendent expenditures). 
63  H.B. 2938, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Wash. 2018) (amending WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.17A (2018)). 
64  Elections Modernization Act, Bill C-76 § 208.1 (enacted as S.C. 2018, c 31 (Can.)) (re-
placing the Fair Elections Act, S.C. 2014, c 12). Akin to the situation in Washington State,  
Jim Brunner & Christine Clarridge, Why Google Won't Run Political Ads in Washington 
State for Now, SEATTLE TIMES (June 7, 2018, 6:23 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattl 
e-news/google-halts-political-ads-in-washington-state-as-disclosure-law-goes-into-effect/ 
[https://perma.cc/WC65-34KS], Google pulled or blocked all ads that fell within C-76’s pur-
view ahead of federal elections in March 2019. Tom Cardoso, Google to Ban Political Ads 
Ahead of Federal Election, Citing New Transparency Rules, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-google-to-ban-political-ads-ahead-of-feder 
al-election-citing-new/ [https://perma.cc/3HJR-Q58F]. 
65  Renee DiResta, Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True, 106 
YALE REV. 12, 12, 14–15 (2018). 
66  Stefan Wojcik et al., Bots in the Twittersphere, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/04/09/bots-in-the-twittersphere/ [https://perma.cc/8GXU-
MV5U] (finding two-thirds of tweeted links were bots); see also Madeline Lamo & M. Ryan 
Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 990 (2019). 
67  For a discussion on platform recommendations, see Deep Fakes and the Next Generation 
of Influence Operations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/e 
vent/deep-fakes-and-next-generation-influence-operations [https://perma.cc/568M-3KCZ]. 
68  S.B. 1001, 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified in CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17940 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of 2021 Reg. Sess.)). 
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ing accounts.69 It requires that any “automated online [“bot”] account” engag-
ing a Californian on a purchase or a vote must identify itself as a bot.70 Notably, 
the law makes clear that it “does not impose a duty on service providers of 
online platforms.”71 
At the federal level, the proposed Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act72 
would clamp down on the use of social media bots by political candidates. 
Candidates, their campaigns, and other political groups would not be permitted 
to use bots in political advertising.73 Moreover, the FTC would be given power 
to direct the platforms to develop policies requiring the disclosure of bots by 
their creators/users.74 Another federal proposal would require platforms to iden-
tify inauthentic accounts and determine the origin of posts and/or accounts.75 
Finally, the European Commission’s artificial intelligence ethics guidelines in-
clude a provision that users should be notified when they are interacting with 
algorithms rather than humans. 76 
Deepfakes are another technique to distort democratic discourse by con-
cealing authorship.77 Facebook is entreating developers to produce better detec-
tion systems for deepfakes.78 Early legislative efforts at the federal level79 and 
 
69  Selina Wang, California Would Require Twitter, Facebook to Disclose Bots, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 3, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-03/california-
would-require-twitter-facebook-to-disclose-bots [https://perma.cc/F44E-XY2X] (quoting 
State Senator Bob Hertzberg, who introduced the bill). 
70  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17941(a), 17940(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 
Reg. Sess.). 
71  Id. § 17942(c). 
72  Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act, S. 3127, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018). A similar bill 
was introduced in the California Assembly by Marc Levine (D-San Rafael). A.B. 1950, Gen. 
Assemb., 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
73  Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act, S. 3127, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018). 
74  Id. § 4(b). 
75  Warner Policy Proposals, supra note 59, at 6. 
76  HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GRP. ON A.I., EUR. COMM’N, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY 
AI 18 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworth 
y-ai [https://perma.cc/FWP2-E2CJ]; see also AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER 
COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY: PRELIMINARY REPORT 319 (2018), https://www.accc. 
gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20Digital%20Platforms%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20R 
eport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ89-ARCG]. For a particularly relevant section, see id. § 7.3. 
77  See, e.g., Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Pri-
vacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1759, 1787, 1814 (2019) 
(discussing solutions such as forensic technology, digital provenance, and authenticated alibi 
services). 
78  Devin Coldewey, Facebook Is Making Its Own Deepfakes and Offering Prizes for Detect-
ing Them, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 5, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/05/facebo 
ok-is-making-its-own-deepfakes-and-offering-prizes-for-detecting-them [https://perma.cc/P8 
9F-3MKX]. 
79  Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act, S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018) (would criminal-
ize the creation or distribution of a deep fake that facilitates illegal conduct); see also Decep-
tive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, H.R. 6607, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018) 
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the state level80 would penalize propagators of deepfakes in various circum-
stances. The most notable federal proposal—the DEEPFAKES Accountability 
Act—would address the manipulative possibilities of deepfakes by requiring 
anyone creating synthetic media featuring an imposter to disclose that the me-
dia was altered or artificially generated.81 Such disclosure would have to be 
made through “irremovable digital watermarks, as well as textual descrip-
tions.”82 This sort of “digital provenance” only works if the marks are ubiqui-
tous and unremovable—both of which are unlikely.83 As Devin Coldewey criti-
cally observes, “[t]he law here is akin to asking bootleggers to mark their 
barrels with their contact information.”84 If it is not effective or enforceable, at 
the very least the law serves an expressive purpose by stating (or restating) that 
informational fidelity is worth pursuing. 
While most of these proposals deal with direct-to-consumer transparency, 
there are also new proposed and adopted rules to benefit information interme-
diaries. There are many versions of an advertising archive requirement.85 The 
Honest Ads Act would require platforms to maintain a political ad repository of 
all political advertisers that have spent more than $500 on ads or sponsored 
posts.86 Canada’s political advertising law also mandates an ad repository.87 On 
the state level, the California Disclose Act requires political campaign advertis-
 
(would criminalize the intentional publication of false information about elections within 
sixty days of an election). 
80  A.B. 8155, State Assemb., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2017) (would extend the right 
of publicity such that “an individual’s persona is the personal property of the individual” and 
“the use of a digital replica for purposes of trade within an expressive work [absent consent] 
shall be a violation” of the act with exceptions for commentary, etc.); A.B. 1280, State As-
semb., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019) (would criminalize the creation or distribution 
of a deep fake that depicts a person engaging in sexual conduct or that intends to coerce or 
deceive voters within 60 days of an election); see also S.B. 751, 86th Leg. § 1 (Tex. 2019) 
(codified in TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of 
the 86th Leg.)) (criminalizing the creation of a deep fake within thirty days of an election 
period with the intent to deceive and “influence the outcome of the election”). 
81  Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation Sub-
ject to Accountability Act, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019). 
82  Devin Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act Would Impose Unenforceable Rules—
but It’s a Start, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/ 
deepfakes-accountability-act-would-impose-unenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start [https://perm 
a.cc/KRH6-RMC2]. 
83  See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War, 
FOREIGN AFFS. (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-
11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war [https://perma.cc/BP67-6XPM] (expressing skep-
ticism toward the “digital provenance” solution). 
84  Coldewey, supra note 82. 
85  See generally Paddy Leerssen et al., Platform Ad Archives: Promises and Pitfalls, 8 
INTERNET POL’Y REV. (2019) (providing comprehensive review of ad archive developments 
in the U.S. and Europe). 
86  Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. § 8 (2019). 
87  Elections Modernization Act, Bill C-76 § 208.1 (enacted as S.C. 2018 c 31 (Can.)) (re-
placing the Fair Elections Act, S.C. 2014, c 12). 
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ers to list their top three contributors and requires platforms to maintain a data-
base of political ads run in the state.88 The New York State Democracy Protec-
tion Act mandates that political ads be collected in an online archive main-
tained by the State Board of Elections.89 Washington State requires disclosure 
of who paid for a political ad, how much the advertiser spent, the issue or can-
didate supported by the ad, and the demographics of the targeted audience.90 
Much about this adaptation of analog-era transparency rules to digital is 
good and necessary. But it will not be sufficient, either as a matter of transpar-
ency policy or as more general instrument of digital information fidelity. 
III. FIDELITY OF SYSTEM—KNOW WHO THE SYSTEM IS TALKING TO 
Digital platforms serve up content and advertising to listeners to capitalize 
on cognitive vulnerabilities that have surfaced through pervasive digital sur-
veillance.91 The noise problem on digital platforms is different than on analog 
ones in part because the business model pushes content to soft targets, where 
cognitive resistance is impaired. Merely updating analog-era transparency rules 
as an approach to information fidelity misses this fundamental point about how 
digital audiences are selected for content. Analog mass media and advertising 
transparency regimes, embodied in such practices as sponsorship identification, 
seek to combat manipulation at the level of the message. But digital manipula-
tion transcends the message.92 It is systemic. The actual message is only the end 
 
88  CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84503–84504.6 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 85 of 2020 Reg. 
Sess.). 
89  N.Y. ELEC. § 14-107 (McKinney 2020). 
90  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345(1) (2020). Hours after the disclosure law went into effect 
on June 7, 2018, Washington State’s Public Disclosure Commission issued an emergency 
rule clarifying that platforms like Google were subject to it. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-18-
050(1)–(3) (2020). In response to the new law, Google said it pulled all covered ads. Brunner 
& Clarridge, supra note 64. Washington State is suing both Google and Facebook for run-
ning political ads without sufficient disclosure. Monica Nickelsburg, Washington State Af-
firms Rule Requiring Facebook and Google To Make Political Ad Disclosures, GEEKWIRE 
(Nov. 29, 2018, 2:42 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/2018/washington-state-affirms-rule-
requiring-facebook-google-make-political-ad-disclosures [https://perma.cc/JA8T-SQD2]. 
91  See, e.g., Karen Yeung, Hypernudge: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20 
INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 118, 123–24 (2017); ANTHONY NADLER ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y, 
WEAPONIZING THE DIGITAL INFLUENCE MACHINE: THE POLITICAL PERILS OF ONLINE AD TECH 
6 (2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DS_Digital_Influence_Machin 
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YZS-2NA9] (showing how platform advertising systems are “used 
to prioritize vulnerability over relevance”). 
92  Daniel Susser et al., Technology, Autonomy, and Manipulation, INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 4 
(2019) (defining online manipulation as “intentionally and covertly influencing their deci-
sion-making, by targeting and exploiting their decision-making vulnerabilities”); see also 
Cass Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 213, 216 (2015) (“I suggest 
that an effort to influence people’s choices counts as manipulative to the extent that it does 
not sufficiently engage or appeal to their capacity for reflection and deliberation.”); see also 
The Ethics of Manipulation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 22, 2020), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-manipulation/ [https://perma.cc/473Q-BNUE] (con-
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product of a persuasive effort that starts with personal data collection, personal 
inferences, amplification, and tailoring of messages to the “right” people, all of 
which happens in the dark.93 
Advertisers always tried to target segmented audiences with persuasive 
messages, but analog technologies offered only scattershot messaging to the 
masses. System architecture made it impossible to hide where the messages 
went; distribution was evident. All listeners of channel x were exposed to y 
content at z moment (give or take some time shifting). On social media plat-
forms like Facebook and Twitter, obfuscation and manipulation are emergent 
properties of algorithmically mediated speech flows that surface communica-
tions based on microtargeting and personal data collection.94 In the current en-
vironment, no one can easily solve for x, y, and z. Moreover, people are ill 
equipped to filter out noise in light of digital design features that depress cogni-
tive autonomy, as discussed below.95 Manipulation in this context resides not 
only in the individual messages but also in the algorithmic production of sali-
ence. Transparency mechanisms designed mainly to strengthen cognitive re-
sistance to discrete messages will not be enough to secure freedom of mind. 
Policy should boost signal throughout the system, through transparency and 
other means. 
A. Algorithmic Noise 
As Julie E. Cohen observes, 
Algorithmic mediation of information flows intended to target controversial ma-
terial to receptive audiences . . . inculcating resistance to facts that contradict 
preferred narratives, and encouraging demonization and abuse. . . . New data 
harvesting techniques designed to detect users’ moods and emo-
tions . . . exacerbate these problems; increasingly, today’s networked infor-
mation flows are optimized for subconscious, affective appeal.96 
She is touching on a complex of problems related to polarization, outrage, 
and filter bubbles. Platforms systematically demote values of information fidel-
ity. There is a collapse of context between paid advertisements and organic 
content, between real and false news, between peer and paid-for recommenda-
tions. Jonathan Albright describes a “micro-propaganda machine” of “behav-
 
trasting rational persuasion with manipulation); Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in 
the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 158 (2019). 
93  See NADLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 1 (identifying three stages in the “digital influence 
machine”: the development of “detailed consumer profiles;” the capacity “[t]o target custom-
ized audiences, or publics, with strategic messaging across devices, channels, and contexts;” 
and the capacity “[t]o automate and optimize tactical elements of influence campaigns, lev-
eraging consumer data and real-time feedback to test and tweak key variables including the 
composition of target publics and the timing, placement, and content of ad messages”). 
94  See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US 
AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 6 (2018). 
95  Infra Section III.A. 
96  Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 150 (2017). 
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ioral micro-targeting and emotional manipulation—data-driven ‘psyops’” “that 
can tailor people’s opinions, emotional reactions, and create ‘viral’ sharing 
(😆LOL/haha/😡RAGE) episodes around what should be serious or contempla-
tive issues.”97 
Platform algorithms boost noise through the system as a byproduct of the 
main aim: engagement (subject to some recent alterations to content modera-
tion practices). In order to maximize and monetize attention capture, the major 
digital platforms serve up “sticky” content predicted to appeal based on person-
al data.98 Dipayan Ghosh writes that “[b]ecause there is no earnest considera-
tion of what consumers wish to or should see in this equation, they are subject-
ed to whatever content the platform believes will maximize profits.”99 
Platforms understand what content will maximize engagement through a pro-
cess of data harvesting that Mark Andrejevic has called “digital enclosure.”100 
Algorithmic promotion is abetted, often unwittingly, by the users themselves, 
who are nudged to amplify messages that on reflection they might abjure. In 
this respect, users are manipulated not (or not only) via a specific message but 
through technical affordances that drive them into message streams without 
care for message quality. This production of salience happens below the level 
of the message. Listeners relate to information unaware of the digital undertow.  
The Council of Europe directly confronted the ways in which platform de-
sign undermines cognitive autonomy in its 2019 Declaration on the Manipula-
tive Capabilities of Algorithmic Processes.101 Machine learning tools, the 
Council said, have the “capacity not only to predict choices but also to influ-
ence emotions and thoughts and alter an anticipated course of action, some-
 
97  Jonathan Albright, The #Election2016 Micro-Propaganda Machine, MEDIUM (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://medium.com/@d1gi/the-election2016-micro-propaganda-machine-383449cc1f 
ba [https://perma.cc/58ZV-8ZAZ]; see also NADLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 32 (“Many of 
the most popular social media interfaces are designed in ways that favor the spread of con-
tent triggering quick, emotionally intense responses.” (citing Kerry Jones, et al., The Emo-
tional Combinations That Make Stories Go Viral, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 23, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/05/research-the-link-between-feeling-in-control-and-viral-content 
[https://perma.cc/XDS2-CCBK]; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 94, at 138)). 
98  See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1015 
(2014). 
99  Dipayan Ghosh, Facebook’s Oversight Board Is Not Enough, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 16, 
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough [https://perma.cc/T 
C8U-YSQB]. 
100  Mark Andrejevic, Privacy, Exploitation, and the Digital Enclosure, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 
47, 53 (2009) (defining “digital disclosure” as being “the creation of an interactive realm 
wherein every action, interaction, and transaction generates information about itself”) (draw-
ing on James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33). 
101  Committee of Ministers, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on the Manipulative 
Capabilities of Algorithmic Processes, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://search.coe.i 
nt/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=090000168092dd4b [https://perma.cc/YFP9-RZN 
Z]. 
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times subliminally.”102 The Declaration further states that “[f]ine grained, sub-
conscious and [personalized] levels of algorithmic persuasion may have signif-
icant effects on the cognitive autonomy of individuals and their right to form 
opinions and take independent decisions.”103 The Declaration’s supposition is 
supported by research showing how digital speech flows are shaped by data 
harvesting and algorithmically driven and relentlessly monetized platform me-
diation.104 
Platform priorities and architecture have reshaped public discourse in ways 
that individual users cannot see and may not want.105 Platforms flatten out the 
information terrain so that all communications in theory have equal weight, 
with high-fidelity messages served up on a par with misinformation of all 
kinds. This is sometimes called context collapse.106 Stories posted on social 
media or surfaced through voice command are often denuded of credibility to-
kens or origination detail, like sponsorship and authorship, making it hard to 
distinguish between fact and fable, high fidelity and low.107 
 
102  Id. 
103  Id.; COMM. OF EXPERTS ON HUMAN RTS. DIMENSIONS OF AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING 
& DIFFERENT FORMS OF A.I., COUNCIL OF EUR., DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
MINISTERS ON THE MANIPULATIVE CAPABILITIES OF ALGORITHMIC PROCESSES (2018), 
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08ef257 [https://perma.cc/XM52-QFLJ]. 
104  See TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT 
MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 138 (2018). 
105  DIPAYAN GHOSH & BEN SCOTT, NEW AMERICA, #DIGITALDECEIT: THE TECHNOLOGIES 
BEHIND PRECISION PROPAGANDA ON THE INTERNET 2 (2018); Daniel Susser et al., Online 
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 2 (2019) [here-
inafter Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences]; ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA 
& SOC’Y, MEDIA MANIPULATION AND DISINFORMATION ONLINE 3 (2017), https://datasociety. 
net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/R5NS-G9G9]; see also HIGH LEVEL GRP. ON FAKE NEWS & ONLINE DISINFORMATION, 
EUR. COMM’N, A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO DISINFORMATION 10 (2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-
news-and-online-disinformation [https://perma.cc/UKL3-WVWQ]; U.K. SEC’Y OF STATE 
FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT & THE SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, 
ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER 3, 5 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/governme 
nt/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf [ht 
tps://perma.cc/W5Z5-JPUC]; CLAIRE WARDLE & HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, INFORMATION 
DISORDER: TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY 
MAKING 10, 12 (2017), https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-
framework-for-researc/168076277c [https://perma.cc/88TV-C8RM]. 
106  Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users, 
Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 114, 122 (2010); 
Carolyn Marvin, Your Smart Phones Are Hot Pockets to Us: Context Collapse in a Mobi-
lized Age, 1 MOBILE MEDIA & COMMC’N 153, 154 (2013). 
107  STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, STIGLER COMM. ON DIGITAL 
PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT 165–66 (2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/resear 
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Listeners face this material in vulnerable states, by design. Platforms in 
pursuit of engagement may pair users with content in order to exploit users’ 
cognitive weaknesses or predispositions. Design tricks like the “infinite scroll” 
keep people engaged while blunting their defenses to credibility signals.108 
YouTube autoplay queues up video suggestions to carry viewers deeper into 
content verticals that are often manipulative or otherwise low-fidelity.109 Social 
bots exploit feelings of tribalism and a “hive mind” logic to enlist people into 
amplifying information, again without regard to information fidelity.110 
Other design features like notifications and the quantification of “likes” or 
“follows” trigger dopamine hits to hook users to their apps.111 Gratification 
from these hits pushes people to share information that will garner a reaction.112 
On top of this, Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s Suggested Videos use 
predictive analytics to promote virality through a user’s network.113 These 
 
108  Anastasia Kozyreva et al., Citizens Versus the Internet: Confronting Digital Challenges 
with Cognitive Tools, 21 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 103, 112 (2020). 
109  REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & SOC’Y, ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE: BROADCASTING THE 
REACTIONARY RIGHT ON YOUTUBE 36 (2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/201 
8/09/DS_Alternative_Influence.pdf [https://perma.cc/658P-CSYJ]; Kevin Roose, The Mak-
ing of a YouTube Radical, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html [https://perma.cc/5ZE5-LA5T]. But cf. Kevin 
Munger & Joseph Phillips, A Supply and Demand Framework for YouTube Politics (Oct. 1, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/73jys/ [https://perma.cc/P64D-5UL3] (casting 
doubt on the algorithmic radicalization theory that platforms create demand for disinfor-
mation, and suggesting instead that they simply supply existing demand). 
110  Chengcheng Shao et al., The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots, 9 
NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 5 (2018) (“[B]ots are particularly active in amplifying [fake news] in 
the very early spreading moments.”). 
111  See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 
145 (2019) (“After sinking [energy] into the product, the user becomes ‘internally triggered’ 
to come back and check on its performance: Who commented? What did they say? How 
many likes?”); Simon Parkin, Has Dopamine Got Us Hooked on Tech?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 4, 2018, 4:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/04/has-dopam 
ine-got-us-hooked-on-tech-facebook-apps-addiction [https://perma.cc/3F8M-G736]. See 
generally B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE 
THINK AND DO (2003); CTR. FOR HUMANE TECH., Technology Is Downgrading Humanity: 
Let's Reverse That Trend Now, MEDIUM (July 17, 2019), https://medium.com/@HumaneTec 
h_/technology-is-downgrading-humanity-lets-reverse-that-trend-now-893fb9f6e580 [https:// 
perma.cc/FPC6-APLF]. 
112  See Langvardt, supra note 111, at 142. 
113  James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 217, 227 
(2018) (“[P]latforms tend to promote content that already has the characteristics that promote 
virality . . . . With trending topics, this is explicit: these are topics that are already going viral 
(perhaps on a more limited scale). But even the Facebook News Feed and YouTube Sug-
gested Videos are attempts to predict what will go viral most successfully in a user’s net-
work and amplify it with that user.”); Jean-Christophe Plantin et al., Infrastructure Studies 
Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 293, 
301–06 (2018). Facebook uses data collected from user activities “to tailor advertising and 
adjust newsfeed priorities, among other customizations to our personalized walled gardens.” 
Id. at 304. 
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tricks are among what are called “dark pattern” design elements.114 They are 
hidden or structurally embedded techniques that lower cognitive resistance, en-
couraging a sort of numb consumption and automatic amplification while at the 
same time facilitating more data collection, which supports more targeted con-
tent delivery, and so on.115 
That these design features can be responsible for lowering information fi-
delity is something the platforms themselves recognize. Under pressure from 
legislators, Facebook in 2017 said that it would block the activity of govern-
ment and nonstate actors to “distort domestic or foreign political sentiment” 
and “[c]oordinated activity by inauthentic accounts with the intent of manipu-
lating political discussion.”116 In other words, the platform would work to de-
press noise. But this reference to “distortion” assumes a baseline of signal that 
the platform has not consistently supported. Its strategies with respect to news 
zig-zag in ways that have undermined the salience of high-quality information. 
Emily Bell and her team at Columbia University’s Tow Center for Digital 
Journalism have chronicled how Facebook policies influence news providers, 
getting them to invest in algorithmically desirable content (including, for a 
while, video), only to abruptly change directions, scrambling editorial policies 
and wasting resources.117 Facebook decided in 2018 to demote news as com-
pared with “friends and family” posts118 and then the next year created a privi-
leged place for select journalism outlets in the News Tab.119 Policies that are 
 
114  CHRIS LEWIS, IRRESISTIBLE APPS: MOTIVATIONAL DESIGN PATTERNS FOR APPS, GAMES, 
AND WEB-BASED COMMUNITIES 99–110 (2014). 
115  Id. at 6–7, 103–10; Zeynep Tufekci, YouTube, the Great Radicalizer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.ht 
ml?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/HC8V-9Y6S]. 
116  Bethania Palma, Facebook Introduces Measure to Block Advertisements from Sites That 
Share Fake News, SNOPES (Aug. 28 2017), https://www.snopes.com/news/2017/08/28/faceb 
oo-to-block-ads-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/S2J7-TPK3]; Satwik Shukla & Tessa Lyons, 
Blocking Ads from Pages That Repeatedly Share False News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 
28, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/08/blocking-ads-from-pages-that-repeatedly-
share-false-news/ [https://perma.cc/7WQE-66GS]. Two years later, Facebook refused to re-
move advertisements of the Trump presidential campaign that were widely considered to be 
misleading. Craig Timburg et al., A Facebook Policy Lets Politicians Lie in Ads, Leaving 
Democrats Fearing What Trump Will Do, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2019, 1:31 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/10/facebook-policy-political-speech-
lets-politicians-lie-ads/ [https://perma.cc/D5ZD-WAUJ]. 
117  NUSHIN RASHIDIAN ET AL., TOW CTR. FOR DIGIT. JOURNALISM, FRIEND AND FOE: THE 
PLATFORM PRESS AT THE HEART OF JOURNALISM (2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_rep 
orts/the-platform-press-at-the-heart-of-journalism.php [https://perma.cc/MF5Z-WD47]. 
118  Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/101 
04413015393571 [https://perma.cc/6HKL-D3XH]. For the change’s impact on publishers, 
see Josh Constine, How Facebook Stole the News Business, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2018, 
9:10 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/03/facebooks-siren-call/ [https://perma.cc/X53K-
9SAB]. 
119  See Casey Newton, A New Facebook News Tab Is Starting to Roll Out in the United 
States, THE VERGE (Oct. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/25/209306 
64/facebook-news-tab-launch-united-states-test [https://perma.cc/VEG4-H3BM]. 
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both erratic and truth-agnostic allow noise generators, through the canny use of 
amplification techniques, to manipulate sentiment without resorting to inau-
thenticity. Facebook’s editorial policies and their fluidity have led to criticisms 
that the process is lacking in transparency and accountability.120 
Platform design features have to be understood against the platforms’ 
background entitlements and resulting norms. The most significant entitlement 
is their immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.121 
This provision holds platforms harmless for most of the content they transmit, 
freeing them from the liability that other media distributors may face for propa-
gating harms.122 It is not surprising, then, given the legal landscape, that the 
platforms have not developed a strong culture of editorial conscience. They 
have grown up without anything like a robust tradition of making editorial 
choices in the public interest, of clearly separating advertising from other con-
tent, of considering information needs, or of worrying that they might lose their 
license to operate. 
All of these features—business models, architecture, traditions, and regula-
tion—combine with the sheer volume of message exposure to limit the effec-
tiveness of message-level disclosure in digital flows.  
B. Systemic Transparency 
For disclosures to enhance digital information fidelity, it will require more 
than message-level transparency. There are at least two reasons to look further 
down the stack toward greater system-level transparency.123  
The first reason is that message labels may not be effective counters to ma-
nipulation, given the volume and velocity of digital messaging. In studies of 
false news, researchers have found that users repeatedly exposed to false head-
lines on social media perceive them as substantially accurate even when they 
are clearly implausible.124 Warning labels about the headlines being incorrect 
 
120  See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018). 
121  47 U.S.C. § 230; see ELLEN P. GOODMAN & RYAN WHITTINGTON, GERMAN MARSHALL 
FUND, No. 20, SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE FUTURE OF 
ONLINE SPEECH 2–3 (2019), http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/Good 
man%20%20Whittington%20-%20Section%20230%20paper%20-%209%20Aug.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/8E8P-H3Y4]. 
122  ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, EFF, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/H25S-7BNQ]. 
123  But see Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the 
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y 973, 973 (2018) (calling into question transparency as an effective policy lever for 
digital platforms). 
124  See, e.g., Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Who Falls for Fake News? The Roles of 
Bullshit Receptivity, Overclaiming, Familiarity, and Analytic Thinking, 88 J. PERSONALITY 
185, 186 (2020); Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misin-
formation, 33 POL. COMMC’N 460, 475–76 (2016). 
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had no effect on perceptions of credibility or even caused people to share the 
information more often.125 The frictionless sharing that digital platforms enable 
may simply overwhelm signifiers of compromised informational integrity de-
livered at the point of consumption. 
In important ways, by the time the message is delivered to the user, mean-
ing has already been made. The messages on the surface are epiphenomenal of 
algorithmic choices made below. This is the second reason to push transparen-
cy mandates to lower down in the stack where algorithmic amplification deci-
sions reside. How can we render visible the “authorship” of information flows? 
It’s not enough for the individual to know who is messaging her. What is trend-
ing and what messages are reaching which populations are a function of algo-
rithmic ordering and behavioral nudges hidden from view.126 Salience is a 
product of these systemic choices. 
European governments are trying to address algorithmic manipulation 
through transparency rules geared to the algorithmic production of salience. 
Among other regulators, the UK Electoral Commission aspires to fill in the la-
cunae of campaign ad microtargeting, where “[o]nly the company and the cam-
paigner know why a voter was targeted and how much was spent on a particu-
lar campaign.”127 A report commissioned by the French government has 
proposed “prescriptive regulation” that obliges platforms to be transparent 
about “the function of ordering content,” among other features.128 This includes 
transparency about “the methods of presentation, prioritisation and targeting of 
the content published by the users, including when they are promoted by the 
platform or by a third party in return for remuneration.”129 Similarly, a UK Par-
liament Committee report in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
has recommended that “[t]here should be full disclosure of the targeting used as 
part of advertising transparency” and that “[p]olitical advertising items should 
be publicly accessible in a searchable repository—who is paying for the ads, 
which organisations are sponsoring the ad, who is being targeted by the ads.”130 
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Maryland’s electioneering transparency law would also have mandated exten-
sive disclosure of election ad reach131 but was held unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.132  
Drawing on these and other proposed interventions, we can identify sys-
temic transparency touchstones. Some of these can be addressed by platform 
disclosure, others only by making data available for third-party auditing. When 
Facebook was interrogated by the U.S. Congress over Russian interference in 
the 2016 election, it showed itself capable of disclosing a lot of information 
about data flows.133 This is the kind of information that should be routinely dis-
closed at least with respect to certain categories of paid promotion.134 
Items that should be made known or knowable by independent auditors in-
clude: 
• The reach of election-related political advertisements, paid and organic, 
and revenue figures; 
• The reach of promoted content over a certain threshold; 
• The platforms’ course of conduct with respect to violations of their own 
terms of service and community standards, including decisions not to 
downrank or remove content that has been flagged for violations; 
• The use of human subjects to test messaging techniques by advertisers 
and platforms (also known as A/B testing);  
• Change logs recording the alterations platforms make to their content and 
amplification policies; 
• “Know Your Customer” information about who really is behind the pur-
chases of political advertising. 
 
131  Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act, MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW 
§ 13-405. Sites hosting online were required to disclose “an approximate description of the 
geographic locations where the [ad] was disseminated,” “an approximate description of the 
audience that received or was targeted to receive the [ad],” and “the total number of impres-
sions generated by the [ad].” Id. § 13-405(c)(1)-(3). 
132  Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 523 (4th Cir. 2019). 
133  Mahita Gajanan, ‘I Care Deeply About the Democratic Process.’ Mark Zuckerberg Re-
veals Facebook Election Meddling Plan, TIME (Sept. 21, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://time.com/4 
952391/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-russia-meddling-congress/ [https://perma.cc/8UQJ-FDM 
H]. 
134  Some of these suggestions are proposed by Ranking Digital Rights as new indicators for 
safeguarding digital rights. RANKING DIGITAL RIGHTS, RDR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
INDEX: DRAFT INDICATORS 12–13 (2019), https://rankingdigitalrights.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2019/10/RDR-Index-Draft-Indicators_-Targeted-advertising-algorithms.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/3NGE-RGET]; see also Karen Kornbluh & Ellen P. Goodman, Bringing Truth to the In-
ternet, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS (Summer 2019), https://democracyjournal.org/mag 
azine/53/bringing-truth-to-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/J2MY-6WGX] (“Large platforms 
should be required to implement Know Your Customer procedures, similar to those imple-
mented by banks, to ensure that advertisers are in fact giving the company accurate infor-
mation, and the database should name funders of dark money groups rather than their opaque 
corporate names.”). 
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IV. NOISE REDUCTION VIA FRICTION 
Alongside new forms of systemic transparency, other changes to system 
design are needed to promote signal over noise. Of course, investing in and 
promoting fact-based journalism is important to boosting signal.135 Changes to 
platform moderation, amplification, and transparency policies can help to de-
press noise. But ultimately, it is the individual who must identify signal; com-
munications systems can only be designed to assist the exercise of cognitive 
autonomy. I suggest that communicative friction is a design feature to support 
cognitive autonomy. Indeed, one way to see analog-era transparency require-
ments is as messaging ballast—cognitive speed bumps of sorts. Slow media, 
like slow food, may deliver sociopolitical benefits that compensate for efficien-
cy losses. What might such speed bumps look like in the digital realm? This 
part briefly characterizes the shift to frictionless digital communications and 
concludes with some ideas for strategically increasing friction in information 
flows to benefit information fidelity. 
A. From Analog-Era Friction to Digital Frictionlessness 
The analog world was naturally frictive in the delivery of information and 
production of salience. Sources of friction were varied, including barriers to en-
try to production and distribution, as well as inefficient markets. It was costly 
to sponsor a message and to distribute content on electronic media. And it was 
a “drag”—as in, full of friction—for an individual to circulate content, requir-
ing as it did access to relatively scarce distribution media. Friction protected 
markets for legacy media companies. This was undesirable in all kinds of ways. 
But one of the benefits was that these companies invested in high-cost journal-
ism and policed disinformation.136 
Friction was built into the analog-era business models and technology, 
some of which was discussed earlier.137 Relatively meager (by comparison to 
digital) content offerings were bundled for mass consumption and therefore 
were imperfectly tailored to individual preferences. By dint of this bundling in 
channels, networks, and newspapers, advertisers ended up supporting high-
fidelity information along with reporting on popular topics like sports and en-
tertainment.138 Content scarcity, crude market segmentation, and imperfect tar-
geting of advertising support all served as impediments to the most efficient 
matching of taste and message; technological friction impeded virality.139 Ana-
 
135  See Whitney Phillips, The Toxins We Carry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall 2019), 
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/truth-pollution-disinformation.php [https://perma.cc/PUG 
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137  See supra Part III. 
138  See generally, PICKARD, supra note 27. 
139  See William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 50 (2013). 
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log communications system inefficiencies and limitations did not necessarily 
promote information fidelity. After all, both information and disinformation 
campaigns, truth-tellers and liars, would have to overcome obstacles to persua-
sion. But the friction slowed message transmission to allow for rational consid-
eration. Research on polarization suggests that when people have more time for 
deliberation, they tend to think more freely and resist misleading messaging.140 
Some of the friction in analog media was regulatory, including the mes-
sage-level sponsorship disclosure requirements described above.141 A message 
that says “I’m Sally Candidate, and I approved this ad” forces the listener to 
stop before fully processing the ad to consider its meaning. It is a flag on the 
field, stalling the flow of information between message and mind. That disclo-
sures have the effect of cluttering speech is a knock against them in the litera-
ture on transparency policy. Listeners may be so overloaded with information 
that they don’t heed the disclosures. 142 Their minds may not be open to hearing 
whatever it is the disclosure wants them to know.143 It is nevertheless possible 
that disclosures can function as salubrious friction, simply by flashing warning. 
In their paper on online manipulation, Daniel Susser and co-authors note that 
disclosures serve just such a function, encouraging “individuals to slow down, 
reflect on, and make more informed decisions.”144 
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Digital platforms dismantle cognitive checkpoints along with other obsta-
cles to information flows. For the engineer, friction is “any sort of irritating ob-
stacle” to be overcome.145 This engineering mindset converged with democratic 
hopes for an open internet to produce a vision of better information fidelity. For 
example, by tearing down barriers to entry, digital could amplify “We the me-
dia,” to cite Dan Gillmor’s 2005 book of the same name.146 Decentralized me-
dia authority, it was hoped, would reveal truths through distributed networks, 
leading to a kind of collaborative “self-righting.”147 Building on his earlier 
work on networked peer production, Yochai Benkler conceptualized a 
“networked Fourth Estate”148 that took on the watchdog function of the legacy 
press. Reduced communicative friction did open opportunities for the voiceless. 
But the optimism of the early 2010s did not account for the collapse of legacy 
media as a source of signal or for how commercial platforms would amplify 
noise. Citizen journalists might take advantage of frictionless communications, 
but not nearly to the same degree as malicious actors and market players, 
whose objectives were very different. 
B. New Frictions 
Digital enclosure seals communicators in feedback loops of data that are 
harvested from attention and then used to deliver content back to data subjects 
in an endless scroll. Platforms have bulldozed the sources of friction that were 
able to disrupt the loop. When twentieth-century highway builders bulldozed 
neighborhoods to foster frictionless travel, place-making urbanists like Jane Ja-
cobs articulated how the collision of different uses—something many planners 
considered inefficient—improves communities.149 The sociologist Richard 
Sennett used “friction” to describe aspects of this urban phenomenon, which he 
viewed favorably.150 In communications as in urbanism, a certain degree of 
friction can disrupt the most efficient matching of message and mind in ways 
that promote wellbeing. Specifically, new frictions can promote information 
fidelity. Indeed, given the First Amendment limitations on any regulatory re-
sponse to noisy communications, the introduction of content-neutral frictions 
may be one of the very few regulatory interventions that are consistent with 
American free speech traditions. 
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The use of friction already is both a public policy and private management 
strategy in the digital realm. Paul Ohm and Jonathan Frankle have explored 
digital systems that implement inefficient solutions to advance non-efficiency 
values—what they term desirable inefficiency.151 The platforms themselves are 
voluntarily moving to implement frictive solutions. For example, WhatsApp 
decided in 2019 to limit bulk message forwarding so as to reduce the harms 
caused by the frictionless sharing of disinformation.152 The limit imposes high-
er cognitive and logistical burdens on those who would amplify the noise. At 
the extreme, friction becomes prohibition, which is one way to think about 
Twitter’s decision to reject political advertising because it did not want to, or 
believed it could not, reduce the noise.153 
Forms of friction that could enhance information fidelity and cognitive au-
tonomy include communication delays, virality disruptions, and taxes. 
Communication Delays.  The columnist Farhad Manjoo has written, “If I 
were king of the internet, I would impose an ironclad rule: No one is allowed to 
share any piece of content without waiting a day to think it over.”154 He as-
sumes that people will incline toward information fidelity if encouraged to ex-
ercise cognitive autonomy. This intuition is supported by research showing that 
individuals are more likely to resist manipulative communications when they 
have the mental space and inclination to raise cognitive defenses.155 Are there 
ways to systematize this sort of “pause” to cue consideration? Other examples 
of intentional communications delays adopted as sources of felicitous friction 
suggest that there are. For reasons of quality control, for example, broadcasters 
have imposed a short delay (usually five to seven seconds) in the transmission 
of live broadcasts. Frictionless communications, when it is only selectively 
available, can reduce faith in markets. For this reason, the IEX stock exchange 
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runs all trades through extra cable so that more proximate traders have no 
communications advantage, thereby protecting faith in the integrity of their 
market.156 
As discussed above, platforms deploy dark patterns to spike engagement. 
Businesses routinely ask, “Are you sure you want to unsubscribe?” It should be 
possible for platforms to use these techniques to slow down communications: 
“Are you sure you want to share this?” Twitter has begun to add sources of 
friction by getting users to “quote-tweet” rather than merely retweet – a prac-
tice which encourages users to actually stop and read or watch what they are 
circulating instead of being moved by fast-twitch impulse to share.157 Senator 
Josh Hawley’s proposed Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology Act 
would require platforms to slow down speech transmission as a matter of 
law.158 The Act would make it unlawful for a “social media company” to de-
ploy an “infinite scroll or auto refill,” among other techniques that blow past 
the “natural stopping points” for content consumption.159 While the bill has 
problems of conception and execution, it touches on some of the ways that plat-
forms might be redesigned with friction to enhance cognitive autonomy.160 
Commentators have suggested other ways that Congress could deter platform 
practices that subvert individual choice.161 
According to research on design frictions, these small obstacles placed in 
the way to slow down activity are known as “microboundaries.”162 There is a 
rich design tradition around “slow technology” that seeks to encourage consid-
eration, as opposed to fast-twitch reaction.163 Microboundaries between one 
thing and the next are a slow technology tool manifest in such interstitial que-
ries as “are you sure you want to delete?” or “are you sure you want to re-
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tweet?” In social media, microboundaries introduce a brief pause between first 
exposure and belief formation, reaction, or transmission. Early research sug-
gests that the introduction of design friction in mobile technologies to foster re-
flection “increases the level on understanding of user’s interaction with an ap-
plication . . . [and] leads to a higher level of satisfaction.”164 
Virality Disruptors.  Many forms of noise overwhelm signal only at scale, 
when the communications go viral. One way to deal with virality is to impose a 
duty on platforms to disrupt traffic at a certain threshold of circulation. At that 
point, human review would be required to assess the communication for com-
pliance with applicable laws and platform standards. Pausing waves of virality 
could stem disinformation, deepfakes, bot-generated speech, and other catego-
ries of information especially likely to manipulate listeners. The disruption it-
self, combined with the opportunity to moderate the content or remove it, could 
reduce the salience of low-fidelity communication. Another approach is some-
thing like the sharing limit that WhatsApp imposed to increase friction around 
amplification.165 
Substitute volatility for virality, and it’s easy to see how the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission deploys friction. At a certain threshold of volatility 
in financial markets, it will curb trading to prevent market panic, in effect im-
posing a trip wire to stop information flows likely to overwhelm cognitive 
checks.166 The New York Stock Exchange adopted these circuit-breakers in re-
action to the 1987 market crash caused by high-volatility trading.167 Other 
countries quickly followed suit to impose friction on algorithmic trading when 
it moves so fast as to threaten precipitous market drops.168 The purpose of these 
circuit-breakers, in the view of the New York Stock Exchange, is to give inves-
tors “time to assimilate incoming information and the ability to make informed 
choices during periods of high market volatility.”169 That is, it was expressly to 
create the space for the exercise of cognitive autonomy. Social media platforms 
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should consider adopting a circuit breaker to pause the circulation of misinfor-
mation once the traffic hits some threshold of “virality.”170 Amidst surges of 
misinformation about the Coronavirus, Facebook announced that it was piloting 
this approach.171 
Taxes.  Taxes are also sources of friction that can be deployed to disincen-
tivize business practices that boost noise over signal. Tal Zarsky has called data 
the “fuel” powering online manipulation.172 If so, a tax on data could aid in re-
sistance to manipulation. There are a number of nascent proposals to put a price 
on exploitative data practices. One possibility, for example, would be to impose 
a “pollution tax” on platform data sharing.173 Another is to have a transaction 
tax for advertising on platforms.174 Maryland is the first state to consider legis-
lation introducing such a tax to raise revenue for education.175 These kinds of 
taxes, if well crafted to withstand Constitutional scrutiny, would begin to make 
companies internalize the costs of exploitative data practices. If set to the right 
level, they could attract platforms and online information providers away from 
advertising models that monetize attention and finance the noisy digital under-
tow. Taxes would have the additional benefit of raising revenue that could be 
used to support signal-producing journalism, resulting in higher-fidelity speech. 
CONCLUSION 
It is long overdue that media transparency requirements from the analog 
world be adapted for digital platforms. Informing listeners about who is speak-
ing to them—whether candidate, company, or bot—helps them to make sense 
of messages and discern signal from noise. But this kind of message-level 
transparency will not suffice either to protect cognitive autonomy or to promote 
information fidelity in the digital world. The sources of manipulation and mis-
information often lie deeper in digital flows. By serving up content to optimize 
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time spent on the platform and segment audiences for advertisers, at a volume 
and velocity that overwhelms cognitive defenses, digital platform design priori-
tizes content without regard to values of truth, exposure to difference, or demo-
cratic discourse. The algorithmic production of meaning hides not only who is 
speaking but also who is being spoken to. To really increase the transparency of 
communications in digital flows, interventions should focus on system-level 
reach and amplification, along with message-level authorship. Research sug-
gests that transparency may have limited impact, especially in light of the vol-
ume and velocity of speech. Thus, in addition to transparency, policymakers 
and platform designers should consider introducing forms of friction to disrupt 
the production of noise in a way that respects First Amendment traditions. 
These could include communications delays, virality disruptors, and taxes. 
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